Dual Coding of object relations: An alternative framework for understanding perceptual processing in autism? by Smith, AD & Milne, E
1 
 
RUNNING HEAD: DUAL CODING AND AUTISTIC PERCEPTION 
 
This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published version of this work (the version of 
record) is published by Taylor & Francis in Visual Cognition, in 2017, available at:  
10.1080/13506285.2017.1332702. This work is made available online in accordance with the 
publisher's policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. 
 
 
Dual coding of object relations: An alternative framework for understanding perceptual processing 
in autism?  
 
Alastair D. Smith1 
Elizabeth Milne2 
 
1. School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, UK 




Correspondence should be addressed to either: 
 Dr Alastair D. Smith, School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham 
NG7 2RD, UK; Email: alastair.smith@nottingham.ac.uk. 
 Dr Elizabeth Milne, Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield 




Humphreys (1998) presented a model of attentional selection that was based on within- and between-
object relations. In this paper we argue that the model may offer a more principled, flexible, and 
tractable approach to understanding perceptual differences in autism than current leading accounts 
(i.e. theories of Weak Central Coherence and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning). We briefly review 
these accounts before making a case for the necessity of an alternative conceptualisation. We then 
review the underlying principles of the Dual Coding account, and explore whether it can be applied to 
findings in autism research. Since the model focuses on attentional mechanisms, rather than 
perceptual processing, we argue that it may provide a more valid foundation for understanding the 
relationship between local and global perception in existing autism research findings, which tend to 
be reported in the absence of fundamental differences in visual perception. It is also firmly rooted in 
empirical evidence from typical and atypical populations, allowing scientists to make predictions 
about visual behaviour that can be applied across groups, and in a manner that is fully consistent with 
existing knowledge about perception. Irrespective of how convincing the reader may find this 
argument, we believe that it befits Glyn Humphreys’ scientific heritage to show how his work might 
still provide a clear and elegant solution to a controversial issue. 
 
KEYWORDS: Dual Coding; perceptual organisation; autism; Weak Central Coherence; Enhanced 
Perceptual Functioning  
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At the tail-end of the 20th Century, Glyn Humphreys published a model of object processing that 
specified two parallel routes to coding spatial relations within and between visual features 
(Humphreys, 1998). Perhaps in homage to Paivio’s (1990) theory of mental representations, this was 
dubbed a Dual Coding account. Like all of Glyn’s writing, the paper is elegant, pellucid, and beautifully 
understated. Accordingly, it is well-cited and has made an important impression on 
neuropsychological studies of visual and attentional function. In the present paper, we make the 
argument that this impact has perhaps been too modest, and that the Dual Coding account has the 
potential to bring balance to equivocal theories and findings within autism research.   
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder is a neurodevelopmental condition that is diagnosed on the basis of 
difficulties with social communication, along with restricted patterns of behaviour and interests 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Much contemporary autism research focuses on perceptual 
and cognitive features of the condition, with particular interest in visuospatial perception (for a review 
see: Simmons et al., 2009). Because of the pattern of strengths and weakness exhibited by people 
with autism, it has been suggested that atypicalities in perceptual organisation (i.e. visual processing 
of parts, wholes, and their relationship) may contribute to some of the behavioural features of the 
condition. Here we briefly review theories of visuospatial processing in autism, before then providing 
an overview of the Dual Coding account and elucidating how it differs. Finally, we ask if dual coding 
could provide a more useful approach for autism research and explore how it might be applied to 
existing controversies in the literature. 
 
Perceptual organisation in autism 
Perhaps the first empirical observation of visuospatial atypicality in autism came from a study by Shah 
and Frith (1983), who found that children with autism were faster than matched controls at the 
Embedded Figures Test, where one is required to locate a local shape embedded within a more 
complex global figure. This was later followed by a study from the same group, reporting a similar 
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superiority in the Block Design task (Shah and Frith, 1993). On the basis of these findings, the 
researchers argued that autism is associated with a particular skill in segmenting visual forms, based 
on greater attention to detail and a reduced primacy of the Gestalt. This interpretation has been 
supported by autistic performance in tasks across a variety of paradigms, including visual search 
(O’Riordan et al., 2001), the perception of Navon figures (Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees, 1999), and 
drawing production (Booth et al., 2003).  
 
The broad pattern of behaviours in these tasks has given rise to two major theories of visuospatial 
processing in autism, both focusing on a processing advantage for local elements. The Weak Central 
Coherence (WCC) theory (Frith, 1989; Frith and Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006) was based on the 
principle of a global deficit – people with autism have difficulty integrating part elements into a global 
Gestalt, thus resulting in a detail-focused processing style. This was thought to account for a broad 
variety of behavioural features; for example, just as it might affect a preference for processing local 
letters in a Navon figure, it could also affect the extraction of gist from language (Happé, 1997) and 
preference for activities that are consistent with a detail-focussed perceptual style (Briskman et al., 
2001). In contrast to this approach, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) account (Mottron & 
Burack, 2001; Mottron et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2007) was explicitly couched in visuo-perceptual 
superiority in autism, proposing that enhancements in bottom-up feed-forward processing 
mechanisms (e.g. detection, discrimination) lead to a system that defaults to the local level. The EPF 
account is distinguished from the original WCC position because global processing is seen to be intact 
but not ‘mandatory’ (as it is in typical individuals), whereas WCC proposes a specific deficit in the 
processing of global information (Mottron et al., 2006). 
 
These theories have since formed the basis for many investigations into visual processing in autism, 
and evidence has been proffered in support of both accounts (for reviews see: Behrmann et al., 2006; 
Simmons et al., 2009; Van der Hallen et al., 2015). For example, it has been reported that thresholds 
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for motion coherence are higher in autism, which is suggestive of atypical global processing and 
therefore supports a WCC account (e.g. Pellicano et al., 2005). Equally, studies of hierarchical 
processing using Navon figures have reported intact global precedence effects in autism, alongside 
interference from local details, which supports the EPF position of intact global processing in 
combination with local bias (e.g. Rinehart et al., 2000). The general pattern of findings has, however, 
been equivocal, and whilst some studies have demonstrated local superiorities or global deficits in 
autism, others have reported no difference between autistic and typical groups at either level (e.g. 
Edgin & Pennington, 2005; White & Saldaña, 2011). This heterogeneity is further exacerbated by the 
fact that many studies differ in terms of the level of functioning of their autistic participants, the 
protocols by which they match their typical comparison group, and the exact paradigm that they 
employ (Simmons et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2016). Accordingly, neither theory could be said to 
adequately account for, or appropriately integrate, the full picture of research findings (Van der Hallen 
et al., 2015).  
 
In response to this changing field, the proponents of both accounts have modified the theories from 
their original conception (Happé & Booth, 2008; Mottron et al., 2013), and they have become more 
conceptually similar. Both theories now converge on the principle of a local bias, rather than any kind 
of global deficit, and the WCC position also concedes that global information may be processed 
separately from local detail. The most recent rethinking of WCC (Happé & Booth, 2008) suggests that 
they may be processed separately, and in parallel, although this is not supported by reference to 
existing models of perceptual organisation. In contrast, the most recent description of EPF (Mottron 
et al., 2013) does not specifically describe whether local and global processing occurs in parallel in 
autism, or whether global processing depends on an initial integration of local elements. Both the 
WCC and the EPF accounts could be said to employ terminology that enables them to incorporate 
equivocal findings – i.e. people with autism are not ‘obliged’ to attend to the global percept and, 
instead, are more likely to demonstrate a ‘preference’ for the local level. Both theories therefore 
6 
 
acknowledge that people with autism can process stimuli at both levels, but propose that they might 
sometimes do so differently from neurotypical individuals. Naturally, it is arguable that such caution 
is necessary when attempting to describe a very heterogeneous condition that has yielded equally 
heterogeneous behavioural findings. However, it means that neither theory necessarily requires 
revision in the face of evidence that fails to demonstrate local superiority, or global impairment, in 
people with autism. Moreover, such terminology is a is a rather imprecise way of describing 
hierarchical processing in the absence of any further specification, and it may be that thinking about 
perceptual organisation solely in terms of local and global levels is artificially constraining.  
 
The case for an alternative approach 
The difficulties that WCC and EPF have with accounting for the full range of findings is indicative of a 
number of important issues, both in terms of the heterogeneity of the behavioural effects that they 
attempt to explain and the nature of the theories themselves (Simmons et al., 2009). Although they 
were both conceived to account for the same core phenomena (i.e. detail focus and a reduced primacy 
of the Gestalt), the theories have been specified at very different levels. WCC is a broad cognitive 
account of visuospatial processing and, therefore, does not seek to describe any mechanisms by which 
autistic individuals might prioritise, or be biased towards, visual information at the local level. For 
example, although Happé & Booth (2008) incorporated the premise of a separate stream for global 
processing to the WCC theory, it was described in no more specific terms than that. In contrast to 
WCC, the EPF account has much greater focus on the neural mechanisms that might underlie local 
superiorities, and incorporates findings from studies of low-level and mid-level perception, as well as 
functional neuroimaging. However, as stated earlier, it is agnostic on the relationship between local 
and global levels. Of course, this difference in empirical focus is not itself problematic, although it 
arguably makes these incumbent theories rather poorly-matched opponents when scientists seek to 
understand their data. Furthermore, it is perhaps fair to say that neither theory has been specified in 
relation to existing models of perceptual organisation from related fields in psychology. Marr’s 
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computational model of object recognition (Marr, 1982), Feature Integration Theory (Treisman, 1988), 
and the Reverse Hierarchy Theory (Ahissar & Hochstein, 2004), for instance, all provide established 
accounts of normative processing, and it is interesting that they have not been called upon to help 
elucidate the functions being described.     
 
Equally interesting is the fact that reports of atypicalities of hierarchical processing in other 
populations have not been incorporated into our existing models of visuospatial perception in autism. 
The study of perceptual organisation has a long history in neuropsychology, and there are many 
accounts and models of local and global perception derived from a variety of different populations, 
including people with dementia (e.g. Massman, et al., 1993), viral infection (Martin et al., 1995), and 
stroke (Lamb, Robertson, & Knight, 1990). A particularly apposite example comes from integrative 
agnosia, a perceptual disorder most clearly and intricately described by Glyn Humphreys and Jane 
Riddoch in their studies of patient HJA (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). 
HJA presented with object agnosia (i.e. he was unable to recognise visually-presented objects in the 
absence of low-level perceptual dysfunction or memory deficit) that was specifically related to an 
inability to integrate local elements into a global form. This is relevant to the current discussion 
because integration of visual parts into meaningful wholes is exactly the process that WCC identified 
as being impaired in autism. However, the fact that HJA’s visual impairment is so much more profound 
than the effects that are sometimes reported in the autism literature suggests that the processes 
underlying atypical perception are very different between these populations (furthermore, his 
integrative deficit resulted in a default to the global level: Riddoch et al., 2008). It may be for this 
reason, then, that theories and findings from neuropsychology have not been taken into account in 
autism research (although there is a brief reference to HJA in: Mottron et al., 2006).  
 
The difference between neuropsychological accounts of hierarchical perception and those proffered 
by WCC and EPF perhaps demonstrates a core challenge in autism research. Namely, although people 
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with autism may demonstrate a bias to the local level, sometimes to the apparent detriment of global 
perception, they do not demonstrate a perceptual dysfunction per se (e.g. an integrative deficit is not 
associated with object recognition impairment). Whilst this might therefore suggest that 
neuropsychology cannot provide any relevant insights here, we think that this is a massive oversight:  
neuropsychology not only gives us a fundamental framework for understanding perceptual 
organisation in the same behaviours and tasks, but it has also provided formal means to consider the 
relationship between local and global forms in atypical processing. This is something that is missing 
from mainstream autism research: indeed, Van der Hallen et al (2015) state that there is still no 
operationalisation in autism research of what constitutes global and local levels, and we argue that 
this very conceptualisation may have unnecessarily constrained existing theories. Instead, we suggest 
that a model founded in normative behaviour, and refined by evidence from neurological patients, 
could potentially provide a framework for formally understanding atypicalities in integrative 
behaviour in the absence of clear support for either superior local processing or inferior global 
processing in autism (Van der Hallen et al., 2015). 
 
The Dual Coding account 
On the basis of findings from studies of visual attention, across typical and atypical participants, Glyn 
Humphreys presented the Dual Coding account of object coding, with particular reference to the 
neural locus of the underlying mechanisms (Humphreys, 1998). The model was conceived as an 
alternative to existing accounts of object recognition that were based either on space (i.e. elements 
in the same spatial location are selected for attention: Posner, 1980; Treisman, 1988) or objects (i.e. 
elements that are part of the same apparent form are selected: Baylis & Driver, 1993; Duncan, 1984). 
Since the two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive (i.e. spatial attention can bias object 
selection, and object-based attention can bias spatial orienting), Humphreys proposed that they could 
be conjoined by, instead, making a distinction between within- and between-object coding. Within-
object coding refers to the computation of individual elements as being separate parts of the same 
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object. In contrast, between-object coding refers to the representation of elements as individual 
objects in their own right. Certain classes of object support the two descriptions concurrently; so, for 
example, a bunch of grapes can be coded in a between-object framework as a set of individual objects 
(the grapes) and in a within-object framework as elements within a larger object (the bunch).  
 
This distinction was rooted in earlier studies of the grouping mechanisms that support efficient visual 
search behaviour (e.g. Donnelly, Humphreys & Riddoch, 1991; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; 
Humphreys, Quinlan & Riddoch, 1989). Studies such as these challenged the typical distinction 
between parallel grouping of non-target items in single-feature search, and serial integration of visual 
features in conjunction search (e.g. Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Instead, they argued that perceptual 
similarities between targets and non-targets modulate grouping and, therefore, the efficiency of 
search. So, when non-targets present a homogeneous set of features, they are likely to be uniformly 
segregated from target items as a separate group (i.e. they have a strong within-object 
representation). When non-targets possess a conjunction of features, they may be grouped with 
target items when they share a feature with them – this engenders effortful serial search because 
there are strong within-object associations between target and non-target. However, when the 
similarity between heterogeneous non-targets is greater than the similarity between targets and non-
targets, parallel search can still be observed (i.e. search time is flat across set size because there are 
stronger between-object distinctions to dissociate target and non-target). Thus, there is parallel 
encoding of both single features between elements (i.e. between-object coding) and conjunctions of 
features (i.e. within-object coding), the latter being the foundation of successful object recognition 
(Donnelly et al., 1991). 
 
The core thrust of the formal account of Dual Coding (Humphreys, 1998) was the demonstration that 
these parallel computations can become dissociated following brain damage. For instance, 
Humphreys & Riddoch (1995) reported data from patient JR, who presented with visual neglect (i.e. 
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hemispatial inattention) to a different side of space depending on how spatial relations were coded. 
When reading a word aloud he would make a left-neglect error (substituting the initial letter for 
another), whereas he would make a right-neglect error when identifying each letter individually 
(omitting the final letter). When identifying a word, each letter is represented as part of the same 
string, and so JR manifested within-object neglect for the task. Conversely, the identification of 
individual letters involves the letters being represented as single objects, thus leading to between-
object neglect in JR’s performance. Parallel computation is supported by the fact that JR could identify 
an element in one form of task that was previously misidentified in another; thus, one representation 
does not serve as the input for the other. 
 
Humphreys & Heinke (1998) dissociated within- and between-object representations across patients, 
rather than within the same case. They evaluated a group of five patients who all neglected the left 
side in standard clinical tasks, such as drawing from memory. One experimental test involved the 
discrimination of sex from photographs of faces. In a within-object condition patients were presented 
with a single face which was either male, female, or a chimeric face (formed by aligning the left and 
right halves of opposite-sex faces). The task was to state whether the face was male, female, or a 
chimeric example. In a between-object condition, patients were presented with two whole faces, one 
on either side of the midline. At the start of each trial the patient looked away and either one or both 
faces were replaced. The task was to state which faces had been replaced, and also to state the sex of 
the new faces. Humphreys & Heinke found that some patients showed neglect for the chimeric faces, 
with no neglect in the two-object task (within-object neglect). Other patients showed no neglect of 
the chimerics, but failed to detect the left or right face when two were present (between-object 
neglect). This double-dissociation is consistent with the existence of two forms of representation, and 
on the basis of lesion analysis it was suggested the two forms of neglect are associated with 
contrasting sites of damage: in inferior frontal (within-object neglect) and posterior parietal (between-
object neglect) regions. This finding is in line with the assertion that within-object representations are 
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assimilated within the ventral stream whereas between-object representations are assimilated within 
the dorsal stream (Humphreys, 1998). However, this is nuanced by the fact that within-object neglect 
can occur after putative dorsal lesions (Humphreys & Heinke, 1998), which has been suggested to 
occur due to the role that dorsal areas may play when attention is required to switch from one part 
of an object to another. 
 
Applying Dual Coding to autism research 
The application of a Dual Coding approach to understanding visual selection may offer clear benefits 
to our conceptualisation of visual perception in autism. Aside from the fact that the autism literature 
presents no operationalisation of what exactly constitutes local and global levels, current models are 
unclear on the relationship between them. A Dual Coding approach shifts the theoretical focus away 
from local and global processing, to within- and between-object relations. This shares some 
conceptual similarity with the distinction drawn between local and global levels of processing (Smith, 
2016) – the relationship between local elements in a hierarchical figure (e.g. a Navon letter) can be 
described by between-object representations (i.e. the local letters are represented as objects in their 
own right), whereas the global letter can be described by within-object representations (i.e. the local 
elements are all parts of the same multi-element object). Importantly, however, because the Dual 
Coding theory describes the allocation of attentional resources rather than perceptual processing per 
se, neither process is itself directly responsible for perceiving local or global visual information. This 
level of explanation therefore provides a theoretical basis for predicting atypicalities of visual 
behaviour that can be present in the absence of clear processing differences. In autism, apparent 
atypicalities in integrative behaviour appear to be manifest in the absence of an overt perceptual 
deficit, which suggests that a local bias does not necessarily have ramifications for object recognition 
(c.f. Riddoch et al., 2008). However, if we posit that perceptual differences in autism occur in the 
allocation of visual attention within- and between objects then typical and atypical function across 
many different populations can be reconciled in the same broad model of human visuospatial 
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behaviour. By positing that within- and between-object representations are computed in parallel, the 
Dual Coding approach also offers a formal mechanism for predicting that one stream can operate in 
an atypical fashion, whilst the other is unchanged (i.e. one does not act as an input into the other). So, 
for example, function of the within-object coding stream might differ in people with autism, whereas 
function of the between-object coding stream could be equivalent to that of typical controls.      
 
Existing findings regarding visuospatial processing in autism could be reconsidered in light of the dual-
coding account, and are broadly consistent with the notion of a bias towards between-object coding 
and away from within-object coding in autism. For example, superior performance on the embedded 
figures task (e.g. Pellicano et al., 2006; Shah & Frith, 1983) might relate to a particular skill in coding 
between-object relations, or it could reflect decreased primacy of attention to within-object relations. 
Aspects of autistic performance in visual search tasks could also be accounted for in this manner. For 
example, O’Riordan et al. (2001) found that search for a tilted line amongst vertical distractors was 
equally efficient for autistic and typical groups, whereas only the typical group showed a relative 
decrement when searching for a vertical target amongst tilted distractors. This suggests that 
attentional selection in the autistic group was unaffected by the manipulation of factors that affected 
within-object representations (which is conceptually equivalent to the configuration of elements in 
the array). Again, one could interpret this in terms of a bias towards between-object coding, or a 
relative deficit in within-object coding. The question ultimately requires empirical study, although the 
fact that there is no reliable configural impairment in autism suggests that a bias towards between-
object coding may be more likely.  
 
An alternative approach is to suggest that there is a reduction in the ability to switch between within- 
and between-object representations in autism (see: Mann & Walker, 2003, White, O’Reilly & Frith, 
2009). For example, responding to different levels of a Navon stimulus requires participants to switch 
between judgements based on within-object relations (i.e. the global letter) and judgements based 
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on between-object relations (i.e. the local letters). Differences observed in autistic participants may 
therefore result from difficulty switching between the two, or a greater efficiency in switching from 
one to the other. For example, Rinehart et al. (2000) reported that children with autism demonstrated 
the same global interference effects as typical controls, where they were slower to respond to local 
stimuli when they were incongruent with the global form. However, unlike typical children, autistic 
children also demonstrated a local interference effect, where incongruent local information increased 
response times to global information. The authors argued that this may reflect difficulty shifting to a 
different level of processing, such that autistic children continued to process the local letter after the 
global letter had been identified. This tallies with findings from White et al. (2009), who found that 
autistic children were particularly slow at ‘zooming out’ when switching to the global level, and leads 
to the prediction that switching from between-object to within-object levels is atypical in autism.   
 
The fact that behavioural effects in autism may differ according to the task in hand, or to the stimulus, 
can be accommodated by the Dual Coding approach – some objects are more likely to engender one 
form of processing over another, but this can then change when their properties are modulated, such 
as when grouping cues are altered (e.g. Donnelly et al., 1991; Han et al., 2005; Smith & Gilchrist, 2005). 
Therefore, perception of a given stimulus may be may either be affected or unaffected, depending on 
whether factors more strongly support a within- or between-object solution. So, for example, an 
autistic individual might perform equivalently to a typical control when making a perceptual 
discrimination between grouped stimuli (favouring a within-object solution) but may perform 
differently when drawing a copy of a grouped stimulus (favouring a between-object segmentation of 
parts for sequential reproduction). This broad principle chimes with a recent meta-analysis of 
perceptual organisation in autism (Van der Hallen et al., 2015). The authors found that there was no 
clear support for either superior local processing or inferior global processing. Instead, they argue that 
the speed at which people with autism perceive the global form is modulated by local properties, such 
that it can take longer when there is interference from local details. This echoes the earlier visual 
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search work of Duncan & Humphreys (1989) and Humphreys et al. (1989), placing as much onus on 
the nature of the stimulus and the task in hand as it does on the processing capabilities of the 
perceiver. 
 
Beyond the specification of the mechanisms underlying attention to detail in autism, the Dual Coding 
account offers the potential to further discuss potential neural substrates of perceptual difference 
between autistic and neurotypical populations. Despite our broad assertion that there are few 
reliably-reported perceptual abnormalities in autism that fundamentally impair or enhance basic 
visual perception, there is certainly growing evidence for a range of perceptual atypicalities. For 
example, a number of studies have reported decreased Gestalt perception in autism (e.g. Bölte et al., 
2007; Brosnan et al. 2004), which has led to theories that dorsal stream impairments are at the 
functional root of abnormal responses to the global form (e.g. Atkinson & Braddick, 2005; Pellicano et 
al., 2005; Sutherland & Crewther, 2010). However, this may not map so easily onto the putative 
relationship between within- and between-object coding and the dorsal and ventral streams. As stated 
earlier, within-object coding is broadly conceived as a ventral stream function, whereas between-
object coding is subserved by the dorsal stream (Humphreys, 1998). If, then, visual behaviour in autism 
were to be conceived as a within-object impairment (i.e. autism is associated with a focus on parts 
rather than the Gestalt), one would perhaps posit atypicality in ventral stream function, which would 
be at odds with those theories that implicate the dorsal stream. However, Humphreys & Heinke (1998) 
did identify the role that dorsal areas play when switching attention between different parts of an 
object, which means that there could perhaps be a relationship between dorsal impairments and 
switching between representations in autism (Rinehart et al., 2000; White et al., 2009). This is further 
supported by reports of altered BOLD activation when viewing faces or complex patterns in individuals 
with autism, which has been taken to suggest functional imbalances between the dorsal and ventral 
visual streams (Hubl et al. 2003). At the very least, therefore, these findings provide some anatomical 
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plausibility to considering a Dual Coding account in developing a clearer understanding of visuospatial 
processing in autism. 
 
This issue is far from trivial, however, and we note that it is perhaps impossible for any perceptual 
theory to adequately account for the full heterogeneity of findings in the literature. Whilst a number 
of studies report perceptual anomalies in autism, their precise nature remains elusive and results 
across studies have not been consistent. It is therefore very difficult to build a coherent picture of 
typical or atypical perception in autism on the basis of extant experimental work. For instance, some 
studies find evidence for reduced perception of coherent motion in random dot kinematograms 
(Milne et al., 2002), or reduced perception of biological motion in autism (Blake et al., 2003), whereas 
other studies do not (Jones et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2010). Other domains, such as orientation 
discrimination can appear to be enhanced in autism although, again, results are inconsistent 
(Dickinson et al., 2016; Shafai et al., 2016). Given the variation in research findings, it is impossible to 
reconcile all of this work with our proposal of the Dual Coding Account. However, many of the existing 
studies investigating perception in ASD have utilised a 2AFC experimental design, and recent work has 
raised the possibility that parameters underlying decision making rather than perceptual differences 
may explain task differences between those with and without ASD. For example, using the Drift 
Diffusion Model to model the processes involved in making forced choice decisions regarding stimulus 
orientation, Pirrone et al. (2017) found that adults with and without ASD did not differ in their 
perceptual sensitivity, but rather in their level of conservativeness when making a decision. If this 
finding extends to perceptual judgments other than orientation discrimination then the implications 
are significant and suggest that many conclusions regarding altered perceptual sensitivity in ASD may 
need to be revisited. This highlights the importance of developing theoretical frameworks, such as 
that presented here, coupled with careful experimental approach, to guide understanding of the way 





We have argued that the Dual Coding account presented by Humphreys (1998) might offer a more 
principled, flexible, and tractable approach to understanding atypical perceptual behaviour in autism 
than the present incumbent theories (i.e. WCC and EPF). Application of this model is not an attempt 
to provide an alternative account of visual perception in autism; rather, we suggest that existing 
debates in autism research might benefit from a focus on attentional mechanisms, rather than basic 
perceptual ones. Since the Dual Coding model is based on the allocation of attention within and 
between objects, it can account for differences in some visuospatial behaviours that occur in the 
absence of clear perceptual strengths or weaknesses. This may therefore reflect the existing autism 
research literature more accurately than the models that are usually employed. Importantly, the Dual 
Coding account is founded in empirical findings from both typical and impaired populations, which 
means that one can make clear predictions about behaviour that are firmly rooted in both function 
and neural underpinning. 
 
The veracity of this position must now rest upon further empirical and theoretical endeavour. First, 
we need to undertake a more thorough review of the extant literature in order to gauge how well the 
Dual Coding theory can be applied across the range of extant findings, and under what circumstances 
the questions asked, or paradigms employed, allow us to distinguish between this approach and 
others. This will, no doubt, produce some controversies, such as the aforementioned relationship 
between within- and between-object coding and the dorsal and ventral streams. Second, we should 
formally test the theory by generating predictions that are specific to the Dual Coding theory, and by 
observing effects that could not be accounted for by either WCC or EPF. In some respects, this is not 
as easy to achieve as one might hope, since the incumbent theories are sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate both the presence and absence of visuospatial difference in autism. As a result, it may 
be that one needs to look towards tasks that require participants to specifically allocate attention to 
within- or between-object features, but using stimuli that would not implicate the local and global 
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distinctions that have been drawn by other theories. For example, an 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional (ID/ED) task could be employed, requiring participants to respond 
on the basis of perceptual features shared by stimuli (i.e. a within-object cue) and to ignore an 
irrelevant perceptual cue that distinguished them (i.e. a between-object cue). At a later reversal stage, 
the previously negative cue (i.e. the between-object cue) would then be positive, thus challenging the 
participant to shift their attentional set away from the positive features (i.e. within-object cues) from 
the previous stage. One could therefore predict a difficulty in acquiring a within-object attentional set 
in autism, or a particular difficulty in tasks that required them to shift from a between-object set to a 
within-object one. A similar task has been employed by Yerys et al. (2009) to assess executive 
components of set-shifting in children with autism, which provides a useful precedent for this kind of 
approach.        
 
It is important to note here that we are not proffering Dual Coding as an omnibus account of 
behavioural atypicalities in autism. This contrasts with more recent theories that have attempted to 
provide unifying mechanisms for a variety of features. For instance, Rosenberg, Patterson, & Angelaki 
(2015) suggest that a reduction in neuronal inhibition (i.e. through altered divisive normalisation 
processes) is responsible for the perceptual components of autism. So, when a global response to a 
Navon figure is required, people with autism experience reduced inhibition of the competing local 
representation, compared to typical perceivers. The authors then go on to argue that this mechanism 
can also account for social aspects of the condition. Alternative theories are based more on the 
application of existing knowledge to perceptual and social decisions. For example, Sinha et al. (2014) 
posit that autism is associated with impairments in prediction processes, whereas Pellicano & Burr 
(2012) focus on a reduced influence of previous experience (i.e. attenuated Bayesian priors). Whilst 
all of these theories offer formal mechanisms that carry the potential to integrate perceptual, 
cognitive, and social behaviours, they are not specified at a level that can accommodate the 
heterogeneity of current perceptual findings in the literature. As a result, we argue that the Dual 
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Coding model might occupy a useful position where it can perhaps more accurately describe visual-
cognitive features of autism whilst remaining agnostic to the lower-level mechanisms that give rise to 
atypical performance (whether they are described at a neuro-computational level or a Bayesian one).     
 
Just as we have argued that existing perceptual models are relatively underspecified, and have not 
fully attempted to incorporate existing knowledge of perceptual organisation from other fields of 
psychology, we conceded that this general treatise is likely guilty of both criticisms itself. However, we 
feel that it is a fitting tribute to the legacy of Glyn Humphreys’ contributions to demonstrate how his 
work still has the potential to revolutionise our subject and shine a light on some murky theoretical 
debates. Equally, just as Glyn’s approach to science was very much as a polymath, the future of autism 
research depends on the incorporation of knowledge and approaches from allied fields of the 
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